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Trust Me: Insurers Are Not
Fiduciaries to Their Insureds
BY DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND*
I. INTRODUCTION
he duty of a fiduciary to his beneficiary is essentially that of aTtrustee.' A fiduciary "is bound to act m the highest good faith
toward his beneficiary"2 and he may never seek to gain an
advantage over his beneficiary by any means.' A fiduciary must give
priority to his beneficiary's best interests whenever he acts on the
"Partner, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, Missouri. B.S. 1980, Fort
Hays State University; M.Ed. 198 1, Umversity of Nebraska; J.D. 1988, Umversity
ofKansas. This Article sometimes uses the masculine pronoun "he" for simplicity's
sake; it does not evidence any sort of gender bias.
I owe the title of this Article to Eugene R. Anderson of Anderson Kill & Olick
m New York, the dean of the policyholders' bar and an insightful lawyer, who was
kind enough to share with me a copy of an unpublished paper stating his views on
insurers as fiduciaries. Suffice it to say that Mr. Anderson's views do not match my
own.
'See Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725, 741 (Mont. 1984).
2 Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-20-201 (1946) (repealed 1989)).
1 See zd.
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beneficiary's behalf.4 A fiduciary owes his beneficiary a duty of undivided
loyalty,5 meaning that a fiduciary cannot abandon or stray from this
relationship to further his own interests. Examples of fiduciary relation-
ships include "an attorney for a client, a corporate director or officer for the
corporation or its shareholders, an agent for the principal, a guardian for the
ward, a bailee for the bailor, a partner for the other partners, jomt venturers
for one another, and a physician for his patient."6
Fiduciary relationships maybe found in many areas of law 7 One area
of law generally thought to be free of restrictive fiduciary ties, however, is
that of contract.8 Here the mores of the marketplace control. Subject to
relatively limited duties of commercial honesty, contracting parties are
entitled to treat one another as adversaries, and they are free to pursue their
own interests in the transaction without regard for the interests of others.9
Unlike those who share a fiduciary relationship, parties to a contract
determine their own needs and bargain to obtain them.1" The price of this
independence is a lack of security "No party to a contract has a general
obligation to take care of the other, and neither has the right to be taken
care of."I
Insurance policies are contracts. The parties to an insurance contract
are the insurer and the insured. Given that fiduciary relationships function
in ways alien to contractual relationships, it stands to reason that an
insurer's relationship with its insured is not a fiduciary one. Or does it? A
number of courts have characterized or recogmzed the msurer-msured
I See Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v General Foods Corp., 673
P.2d 660, 676 (Cal. 1983) ("A fiduciary assumes duties beyond those of mere
fairness and honesty he must undertake to act on behalf of the beneficiary,
giving priority to the best interest of the beneficiary.").
I See Burdett v Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A fiduciary duty
is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor, rectitude, care,
loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as the agent would
treat himself.").
6 Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L.
REv 303, 306-07 (1999).
7 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV 795, 795 (1983).
8 See, e.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273,280 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[c]ontract law does
not require parties to behave altruistically toward each other" and that "parties to
a contract are not each other's fiduciaries").
I See William T. Barker et al., Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to its Insureds?, 25
TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 3 (1989).
'0 See Frankel, supra note 7, at 799
"Id. at 800.
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relationship as fiduciary,12 though many do so only in the most cursory
fashion and with little thought or reasoning,'3 and some commentators
strenuously argue that insurers are in fact fiduciaries to their msureds. 4
Furthermore, insurers routinely describe themselves as fiduciaries in court
documents. 5 Insurance compames' advertisements enhance tins perception,
often describing themselves as occupying special positions of trust: State
Farm bills itself as a "good neighbor" ready to help its insureds in times of
need, Shelter Insurance advertises "the Shield of Shelter" (its logo being a
red, white, and blue shield), Prudential has long sold its strength and
12 See, e.g., Polselli v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 531 (3d
Cir. 1997); Highlands Ins. Co. v. NationalUnion Fire Ins. Co., 27 F.3d 1027, 1030-
31 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1994); UnitedNat'l Ins. Co. v. WaterfrontN.Y. Realty Corp., 948
F Supp. 263,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Stetlerv. Fosha, 809 F Supp. 1409, 1422 (D.
Kan. 1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 1993); Village of Momsville Water &
Light Dept. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 775 F Supp. 718, 734 (D. Vt.
199 1); Illinois Masonic Med. Ctr. v. Turegum Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417, 423 (La. 1988);
Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725,730 (Mont. 1984); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 367 A.2d 864,866 (N.J. 1976); Allsup's Convenience
Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 976 P.2d 1, 15 (N.M. 1998); Birth Ctr. v. St.
Paul Cos., 727 A.2d 1144, 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Asermely v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 728 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1999); Prosser v. Leuck, 592 N.W.2d 178, 182-83
(Wis. 1999); DeChantv. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 547 N.W.2d 592,596 (Wis. 1996);
see also Domberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 961 F Supp. 506, 546-47
(S.D.N.Y 1997) (holding that the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
insurer and insured is a question of fact for the jury); Decker v Browning-Ferris
Indus., 931 P.2d 436, 443 (Colo. 1997) (stating that insurer has "quasi-fiduciary"
duty to deal m good faith with insured); Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 962
P.2d 596, 602-03 (Nev. 1998) (stating that an insurer's duty of good faith is "akin"
to a fiduciary relationship), reh'g denied, 979 P.2d 1286 (Nev 1999) (restating
support for jury instruction on fiduciary relationship); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Said, 590 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (1992) (stating that insurer's duty to insured is "ana-
logous" to that ofa fiduciary), opinion superseded by 596 N.E.2d 451 (Ohio 1992).
3 See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 641 (Wash. 1998) (observing that
a Washington statute "creates a fiduciary duty for insurers running to their
insureds").
14 See, e.g., Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Foumier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Coverage, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 385-91 (1998-99) [hereinafter Anderson & Foumier, Why
Courts Enforce]; Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, The Ethics of
Policyholders 'Defense Counsel: Who Is the Client, Who Is the Boss?, COVERAGE,
July/Aug. 1998, at 1, 20-22.
5 See Anderson & Fournier, Why Courts Enforce, supra note 14, at 385-89.
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reliability by advising potential insureds to "get a piece of the rock," while
Allstate tells its insureds and prospective insureds that they are secure in
the company's "good hands."' 6
How is it that insurers, as contracting parties, are sometimes trans-
formed into fiduciaries for their insureds and apparently assigned height-
ened duties? Can they transform their relationships with their insureds from
contractual to fiduciary by way of their own pleadings in occasional cases
or through their advertisements? The base answer to these questions, it
seems, is that insurance policies are different. First, they are adhesion
contracts.' 7 Most insurance policies are standardized form documents.
Insureds typically do not negotiate or assent to the specific provisions m
their policies; indeed, most insureds do not even see their policies until
sometime well after they have purchased coverage. Second, insureds
purchase their policies for peace of mind and security rather than for
financial gain.'" These factors mix to create an environment in which
16 See 12 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 7004, at 51-52 (1981) (suggesting that such advertising slogans cut
against the idea that the parties to insurance contracts deal at ann's length and may
support the recognition ofa fiduciary duty running from insurers to their insureds).
I would argue that insurance companies' slogans and advertisements along the
lines described here do not suggest the existence of a fiduciaiy relationship with
policyholders. These slogans and advertisements simply convey what consumers
can expect of responsible, reputable insurers: that they will act reliably and
reasonably, pay valid claims that their policies cover, and defend claims or suits as
provided in their policies. Insurance markets are competitive. It is common
knowledge among the public that not every loss is covered by insurance. Many
people are skeptical of insurers. That insurers may advertise in ways to promote the
reliability of their products or services, or to lessen consumers' skepticism, ought
not be construed as assuming fiduciary duties.
17 See Bering Strait Sch. Dist. v. RLI Ins. Co., 873 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Alaska
1994); Taylor v Government Employees Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 740, 745 (Haw. 1999)
(quoting Sturla, Inc. v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 684 P.2d 960,964 (Haw. 1984));
Krause v. Krause, 589 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 1999) (quoting A.Y McDonald
Indus. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Iowa 1991)); Lewis v
Allstate Ins. Co., 730 So. 2d 65, 70 (Miss. 1998); Farmers Ins. Group v. Stonik,
867 P.2d 389, 391 (Nev. 1994); Gibson v. Callaghan, 730 A.2d 1278, 1282 (N.J.
1999); Close v. Ebertz, 583 N.W.2d 794, 796 (N.D. 1998); Bratcher v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 828, 830 (Okla. 1998).
Is See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Arz. 1986) (noting that an
insured seeks "protection and security from economic catastrophe" and "peace of
mind"); Love v Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (Ct. App. 1990) ("An
insured does not enter an insurance contract seeking profit, but instead seeks
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unscrupulous insurers can exploit their insureds' misfortunes when
resolving or settling claims and suits. Courts that have cast insurers as
fiduciaries have done so to fill the void created by the parties' disparate
bargainingpower andmsurers' exclusive control over litigation, settlement,
and claim processing. 9
This Article will demonstrate that insurers are not fiduciaries to their
insureds in ordinary circumstances or situations. 0 To hold insurers to the
security and peace of mind through protection against calamity "); Decker v
Browning-Ferns Indus., 931 P.2d436, 443 (Colo. 1997) ("[A]n insured who enters
into a contract of insurance seeks to obtain 'financial security and protection
agamst calamity.' ") (quoting Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1141
(Colo. 1984)); Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 667 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Ky
Ct. App. 1978) (observing that a "purchaser of a fire insurance policy is buying
peace of mind"), overruled by Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v Hornback, 711 S.W.2d
844 (Ky. 1986); Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1179
n.9 (Miss. 1990) ("[A]n insured bargains for more than mere eventual monetary
proceeds of a policy; insureds bargain for such intangibles as risk aversion, [and]
peace of mind "); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130,
139 (Utah Ct. App.) ("[A]n insured may purchase insurance not only to provide
funds, but to provide peace of mind."), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992).
11 See, e.g., Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 727 A.2d 1144, 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999); Prosser v. Leuck, 592 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Wis. 1999); see also Allsup's
Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 976 P.2d 1, 15 (N.M. 1998)
("[An insurer's] fiduciary duty is present 'because of the fiduciary obligations
inherent m insurance relationships and because of concerns arising from the
bargaining position typically occupied by the insured and the insurer.' ") (quoting
Romero v. Mervyn's, 784 P.2d 992, 998 (N.M. 1989)).
Some courts have labeled the insurer-insured relationship "special" rather than
fiduciary for these same reasons. See, e.g., Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v Potter, 912
P.2d 267, 272 (Nev. 1996); Union Bankers Ins. Co. v Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278,
283 (Tex. 1994); Long v. Great W Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 829
(Wyo. 1998).
20 Courts in several jurisdictions have rejected the notion or argument that an
insurer is a fiduciary to its insured. See, e.g., Henry v. Associated Indem. Corp.,
266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 586-87 (Ct. App. 1990); Bernhard v Farmers Ins. Exch., 915
P.2d 1285, 1289-90 (Colo. 1996); Corrado Bros., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co.,
562 A.2d 1188, 1192 (Del. 1989); McCauley v. Suls, 716 A.2d 1129, 1134 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Crossley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 400 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1986); Bagsby v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 1988 WL 9809, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Feb. 10, 1988); Lauzon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 1246,
1248 (Vt. 1995); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 503 (Wash.
1992); Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 893, 900 (W Va.
1998).
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high standards reserved for fiduciaries would prevent insurers from acting
to protect their own interests and those of otherpolicyholders. To routinely
make insurers fiduciaries would preclude them from combating excessive
or fraudulent claims, thus harming the insured public. Insurers' implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing affords insureds all the protection they
need as the weaker party to insurance contracts. In short, there are a
number of valid reasons for rejecting fiduciary duty as a means of
protecting insureds from allegedly predatory or heavy-handed conduct by
insurers.
Part II sketches pertinent aspects of insurance law and fiduciary
relationships. It then explains why insurers are not fiduciaries to their
insureds. Finally, Part II argues that insurers' implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing adequately protects insureds against insurers' alleged
abuses, and that the insurer-insured relationship is a special land of
contractual relationship. Part Im looks at how the law has developed to this
point. It traces insurance law's infection with fiduciary duty and explains
that courts have wrongly used the label "fiduciary duty" to describe an
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing. In doing so they have created
needless confusion.
II. THE INSURER-INSURED RELATIONSHIP
AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. Insurance Law Fundamentals
There are two general categories of insurance: third-party and first-
party "Only liability insurance is truly third-party insurance. Liability
insurance is described as third-party insurance because the interests
protected by the policy ultimately are those of strangers to the contract who
are injured by the insured's conduct."2 First-party insurance protects
insureds against their own losses or injuries n Examples of first-party
coverages include disability, fire, health, life, property, and uninsured and
undermsured motorist insurance.23 Both first-party and third-party
coverages may be combined in a single policy, as in automobile and
homeowners insurance policies.
21 Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and
Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV 74, 80 (1994).
' See Olds-Olympic, Inc. v. Commercial Umon Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 923, 930
(Wash. 1996) (contrasting tiurd-party and first-party insurance).23See Richmond, supra note 21, at 103.
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Liability insurers owe their insureds three duties: a duty to defend, a
duty to indemnify, and a duty to settle claims within policy limits when
appropriate. The first two of these duties are expressly contractual. The
insurer's duty to settle third-party claims within policy limits is implied. It
is the product of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing found in
every insurance policy 24 The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
fundamentally requires that neither party to a contract do anything to mjure
the other's right to receive the benefits of their agreement.
25
Fiduciary duty proponents are attracted to liability insurance because
an insured, when sued, turns over his defense to his insurer and trusts his
personal and financial security to the insurer.26 The insurer controls the
litigation and determines whether to settle the case or take it to trial. The
insured is more spectator m this process than participant. With such a
dependent relationship must come a standard of care that exists independ-
ent of the insurance policy and without specific reference to the policy
terms.27
24 See1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 5.01, at 295 (3d
ed. 1995) ("One of an insurer's obligations under a contract of liability insurance,
arising out of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, is to settle a claim
against the insured ").
It is widely recognized that insurance policies, like all other contracts, contain
an implied duty or promise of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., PPG Indus. v.
TransamericaIns. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999); Clausen v. National Grange
Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 140 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); Best Place, Inc. v Penn
Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334,337-38 (Haw. 1996); Simperv. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. of Idaho, 974 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Idaho 1999); Greenvall v. Maine Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 715 A.2d 949, 955 (Me. 1998); Dairyland Ins. Co. v Herman, 954 P.2d 56,
60 (N.M. 1997); Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24,27 (N.Y
1993); Harter v. Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 631 (S.D. 1998) (quoting and
citing cases); Austin Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1992); Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. ofAm., 462 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Va. 1995); Elmore
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 893, 899 (W Va. 1998); Long v
Great W Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 829 (Wyo. 1998).
1 See Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 813 P.2d 710, 720 (Ariz. 1991);
PPGIndus., 975 P.2d at 655; Habetz v. Condon, 618 A.2d 501,505 (Conn. 1992);
Best Place, 920 P.2d at 337-38; Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d
852, 856 (N.M. 1994); Harter, 579 N.W.2d at 631 (quoting Helmbolt v. LeMars
Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d 55,57 (S.D. 1987)); Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled
Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216 (Vt. 1993); Long, 957 P.2d at 829 (quoting State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 825 (Wyo. 1994)).25See Richmond, supra note 21, at 84.
27See Georgetown Realty, Inc. v Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 14 (Or. 1992).
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The first-party insurance relationship is much simpler and more
straightforward. A first-party insurer owes its insured a single contractual
duty- to pay covered claims or losses. The duty of good faith and fair
dealing supplies the additional requirements that the insurer pay its
insured's covered claim within a reasonable time, that it investigate an
insured's claim before denying it, and so on.28 Unlike the third-party
context, in which the insured surrenders to the insurer the exclusive right
to litigate or settle a claim, no similar relationship of dependence exists m
the first-party setting.29 "Generally, insurer and insured are m an adversary
relationship whenever there is any clan by an insured for loss under any
[first-party] insurance policy ",
30
B. Fiduciary Relationships
The term "fiduciary" connotes a relationship of trust and security 31
Although fiduciary relationships may exist m a great variety of circum-
stances, 32 their extraordinary nature requires that they not be lightly
created 3 Merely acting for another's benefit will not spawn fiduciary
duties unless the alleged fiduciary consciously assumes such duties.34
Similarly, a person's unilateral decision to repose trust and confidence in
another will not create a fiduciary relationship; the intended fiduciary must
act or conduct himself in ways that justify such special reliance.35 Because
' See Richmond, supra note 21, at 111-12.29 See id. at 104-05.
30 State ex rel. Safeco Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v Rauch, 849 S.W.2d 632, 634
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993); see also Universe Life Ins. Co. v Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 60
(Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., concurring) ("[A]n insurer's and an insured's interests are
not aligned when the insured is claiming on his own behalf as they are or should
be in third-party cases m a first-party case, an insurer's interest in challenging
the clain directly conflicts with the insured's interest in making the claim.").
31 See 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary § 383 (1961).
32 See id.
33 See American Med. Int'l, Inc. v Giurntano, 821 S.W.2d 331,339 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1991) ("[A] fiduciary relationship is an extraordinary one and will not be
lightly created; the mere fact that one subjectively trusts another does not, alone,
indicate that he placed confidence in another in the sense demanded by fiduciary
relationships, because something apart from the transaction between the parties is
required.").
" See Rajala v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610, 623 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying
Kansas law).
35See Farmers Ins. Co. v McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
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fiduciary duties are "serious and many,"36 an agreement to assume them is
never presumed.37
The relationship of seller to buyer is not ordinarily characterized as
fiduciary, even though a seller typically has far superior knowledge of its
position, product, and capabilities.3 Nor does the fact that one party to a
transaction has greater bargaining power, superiorknowledge, orthe ability
to exploit the weaker party support the imposition offiduciary duties. 39 The
ability to exploit disparate bargaining power is not a useful test for a
fiduciary relationship as evidenced by a typical agency relationship; that is,
an agent owes his principal fiduciary duties even though the principal
possesses superior bargaining strength.' In the buyer-seller context, the
duty of utmost good faith and single-minded loyalty that characterize
fiduciary relationships simply are not present no matter how disparate the
parties' resources.4 The confidence that contracting parties place m one
another is based on economic self-interest capable of at least some
individual protection.42
The fact that the weaker party to a bargain cannot seek protection under
fiduciary law does not mean that it is at the stronger party's mercy, or that
it must endure overreaching. What it does mean, however, is that the
aggrieved party must seek relief under other doctrines.
C. The Inapplicability of Fiduciary Theory to the Insurer-Insured
Relationship
The insurer-insured relationship is not fiduciary, regardless of whether
the insurance policy at issue is a liability policy or some variety of first-
party coverage. In both contexts insurers have the ability and obligation to
scrutimze the claims presented, to investigate claims, to value claims, to
limit or condition the circumstances m which they will pay, to simply deny
claims, to litigate their insureds' liability, and to otherwise serve their own
interests and those of other msureds.43 Such discretion, calculated
36 Rajala, 919 F.2d at 623.
17 See Id.
38 See id. at 624; Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods
Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 676 (Cal. 1983).
39 See Committee on Children's Television, 673 P.2d at 675.
4o See id. at 675 n.21.
41 See id. at 676.
42 SeeRajala, 919 F.2d at 624.
43 See Barker et al., supra note 9, at 7-8.
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judgment, and allocation or weighing of interests would not be possible
were the insurer-insured relationship fiduciary in nature. 4
Those who advocate a fiduciary relationship between insurers and their
insureds often look to insurers' descriptions of themselves and other
carriers as fiduciaries m pleadings for support." More particularly-
[I]nsurance companies tell courts that other insurance companies are
fiduciaries. Typically, insurance companies make these statements when
seeking insurance coverage for themselves, when seeking reinsurance, or
in trying to shift responsibility to another insurance company.
The best evidence that insurance companies are fiduciaries is the fact
that they frequently represent in court that they are fiduciaries. Indeed,
perhaps most damning is the fact that insurance compames take tus
position when seeking insurance coverage, and reject it when insurance
coverage is sought from them.46
This argument warrants immediate rejection.
The fact that an insurer enmeshed m litigation with another insurance
company describes its adversary as owing it a fiduciary duty evidences
little or nothing,47 and it certainly does not amount to the acknowledgment
or assumption of fiduciary duties m unrelated cases or other situations. For
example, if the forum state's law holds that insurers are fiduciaries m the
context of potential settlements with third-parties, how can an insurer's
argument for judicial application of that law when litigating a dispute with
another carrier constitute the assumption of a duty or a judicial
admission?4" It simply does not and cannot. Propositions of law cannot be
" See iad. at 8 (observing that were the msurer-msured relationship fiduciary,
"[e]very decision of an insurer adverse to an insured would be actionable in tort.
But that is not the law.").
45 See, e.g., Anderson & Fourmier, Why Courts Enforce, supra note 14, at 385-
89.
'EugeneR. Anderson & Susannah Crego, TrustMe: Insurance Companies Are
Fiduciaries 12-13 (May 6, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
47 Insurance companies probably would be wise to avoid describing themselves
or other carriers as fiduciaries or as owing fiduciary duties, and to demand that
their counsel not do so, precisely to foreclose this sort of argument.
48 "Judicial admissions are formal concessions in pleadings, or stipulations by
a party or its counsel, that are binding upon the party making them." Keller v
United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995). Judicial admissions must
be statements offactimade to a court, as opposed to legal arguments. SeeNew York
State Nat'l Org. for Women v Terry, 159 F.3d 86, 97 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998).
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the subject of judicial admissions,4 9 and arguments made m support of a
litigant's theory or position do not constitute either a judicial admission °
or a "party admission."51 The most that can be said is that the msur-
ance company is arguing controlling law to support its position in a single
case, as is any litigant's right. The insurer may think the law wrong
generally, or the proposition unsound m theory, but that does not prevent
it from using it to its benefit, even if it wants to take a different position m
a different jurisdiction. Such alternative argument is neither inproper nor
duplicitous.
1. Liability Insurance
Claims or pronouncements that an insurer is a fiduciary to its insured
typically are made m the liability insurance context.52 In Prosser v. Leuck,3
for example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that "[b]y entering
into an insurance contract and taking control of settlement or litigation the
insurer assumes a fiduciary duty on behalf of the insured." 4 A Pennsylva-
ma court recently observed that a liability insurer "assumes a fiduciary
responsibility" to its insured "when handling, inter alia, all third party
claims brought against the insured."' In Asermely v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,56 the Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that "[i]t is not sufficient
that the insurance company act in good faith"57 when considering a
plaintiff's reasonable offer to settle a case against the insured for an
amount within the insurer's liability limits. Rather, the insurer's duty in
49 See Guidry v Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700,
716 (1993), on reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063
(1995).
" See Terry, 159 F.3d at 97 n.7
51 Seeln re San JuanDuPont PlazaHotel Fire Litig., 802 F Supp. 624,639 n.39
(D.P.R. 1992) (holding that insurers' admission that definition of "advertising
liability" was ambiguous during argument did "not constitute a party admission"),
aff'd, 989 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1993).
52 See, e.g., Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 727 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999);
Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999); Prosser v Leuck, 592
N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1999).
51 Prosser v. Leuck, 592 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. 1999).
54Id. at 182.
55 Birth Ctr., 727 A.2d at 1155 (citing Gedeon v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 188 A.2d 320, 322 (Pa. 1963)).
56 Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999).
57Id. at 464.
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such a situation "is a fiduciary obligation to act m the best interests of the
insured." 8
It can thus be said that some courts make a liability insurer a fiduciary
to its insured by blending the insurer's contractual duty to defend with its
implied duty to settle claims within policy limits. This insurance cocktail
is equal parts bad law and bad reasoning.
A fiduciary owes his beneficiary undivided loyalty, and he "musttreat
the [beneficiary's] interests as paramount when exercising powers or
discretion arising from the relationshp."59 A liability insurer's duties to its
insureds are fundamentally different. Looking first at an insurer's defense
obligation, a liability insurer has a right to defend its insured as well as a
duty to do so.6" An insurer has this right because in the overwhelming
majority of cases only the insurer's assets are at risk; the insured has no
personal exposure because any judgment or verdict will fall within the
insurer's policy limits. The insurer accordingly has the right to select
defense counsel, to make strategic or tactical decisions, to weigh the cost
of defense against any potential verdict and offer to settle on that basis, and
the like. In most instances, the insurer is free to settle or litigate an action
without fear of liability to its insured for decisions with which the insured
disagrees.6' Even where an insured may have important interests (e.g.,
reputation) that he wants to vindicate by way of a trial, the insurer typically
has the contractual right to settle as it deems expedient and can protect its
economic interests by settling to avoid additional defense costs or any
possible verdict.62 The insurer's interests thus trump the insured's interests.
That would not be possible were the insurer-insured relationship truly
fiduciary For that matter, the mere fact that an insurer can defend its
insured under a reservation of rights indicates that the duty to defend is a
poor basis for the recognition of a fiduciary duty 63
58 Id.
59 Barker et al., supra note 9, at 2.
60 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 681 N.E.2d 552,561 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078,
1083-84 (Md. 1997); Moeller v. American Guar. & Lab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d
1062, 1068-70 (Miss. 1996).
61 See Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 372, 376 (La. 1996) ("In the
absence of bad faith, a liability insurer generally is free to settle or to litigate at its
own discretion, without liability to its msured for ajudgment in excess of the policy
limits.").
62 See, e.g., Miller v Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, 978 P.2d
922, 928-29 (Kan. 1999).
6 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 503 (Wash. 1992).
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Moreover, it cannot be that an insurer's control of litigation against its
insured amounts to a degree of control over the insured that would spawn
a fiduciary relationship.' 4 An insured can always have avoice in its defense
by hiring independent counsel to monitor the insurer's litigation conduct. 5
The insured also has some say in his defense because he shares an attorney-
client relationship with the attorney hired by the insurer to defend him, and
the defense attorney has ethical obligations to hin that exist independent
of the insurance policy 6 The insurer's control of the insured's defense is
therefore exclusive only if the insured chooses to make it so. The insured's
ability to retain at least some control over its defense is mconsistent with
a fiduciary relationship based on the surrender of personal control to
another.67
Turning next to liability insurers' implied duty to settle, it is inportant
to recognize that the duty is not absolute. An insurer's duty to settle on the
insured's behalf does not translate into a unilateral requirement that it pay
policy limits on demand,68 nor is an insurer required "to engage in
unproductive and irrelevant [settlement negotiations] solely for sake of
form."69 An insurer can have no implied duty to settle unless the plaintiff
makes a settlement offer within policy limits.70 And, even then, an insurer
may opt for a vigorous defense over settlement if it reasonably believes that
I See Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285, 1289 (Colo. 1996) ("The
determination of whether a true fiduciary relationship exists depends upon the
degree of control exercised by the fiduciary over the affairs of the other person.").
65 See id.
66 See Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1154 (Haw. 1998); Rogers v.
Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 407 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ill. 1980);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 269 (Miss. 1988); see
also Prevratil v. Mohr, 678 A.2d 243, 250 (N.J. 1996) (stating that "in any
litigation, counsel for an insurer must put the insured's interests ahead of the
insurer's"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mabry, 497 S.E.2d 844, 847 (Va. 1998)
("The attorney employed by the insurer to defend the msured'is bound by the same
high standards which govern all attorneys, and owes the insured the same duty as
if he were privately retained by the insured.' ") (quoting Norman v Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902, 907 (Va. 1978)).
67 See Bernhard, 915 P.2d at 1289.
68 See Lehto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 814, 822 (Ct. App. 1994).
69 Rhiel v. Wisconsin County Mut. Ins. Corp., 568 N.W.2d4, 8 (Wis. Ct. App.),
review dismissed, 568 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 1997).
70 If the plaintiff's settlement offer exceeds the applicable policy limits, the
insurer cannot later be held liable for refusing to settle. See, e.g., Texas Farmers
Ins. Co. v. Sonano, 881 S.W.2d 312,314-15 (Tex. 1994); McLaughlin v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 566-67 (Ct. App. 1994).
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the insured is not liable, or that the plaintiff's demand exceeds a probable
jury award.71 Courts do not presuppose that settlement is always the
preferred means of protecting the insured's interests.72
There are, of course, reasonable limits on an insurer's discretion when
presented with a choice of a policy limits settlement versus continued
litigation. The insurer cannot subordinate the insured's interests to its
own.3 In weighing whether to accept or reject a policy limits settle-
ment offer, the insurer must give the insured's interests the same con-
sideration that it gives its own interests.74 What this means, as a practical
matter, is that when presented with a settlement offer an insurer should
seriously and carefully evaluate the possibility that a judgment might be
entered against the insured that exceeds policy limits. As the Smith v
Audubon Insurance Co.75 court explained, "a liability insurer is the
representative of the interests of its insured, and the insurer, when handling
claims, must carefully consider not only its own self-interest, but also its
insured's interest so as to protect the insured from exposure to excess
liability " 76
The establishedprmciple that an insurer weighing settlement need only
give its insured's interests consideration equal to its own in order to satisfy
its duty of good faith and fair dealing is inconsistent with the existence of
a fiduciary relationship.77 A fiduciary must give his beneficiary's interests
paramount consideration, not equal consideration. Were the insurer-insured
relationship a true fiduciary relationship, the insurer would always be
71 See Lyndwood, Inc. v CNA Ins. Cos., No. C7-93-1176, 1994 WL 6842, at
* 1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1994); see also Anglo-American Ins. Co. v. Molin, 670
A.2d 194, 197-98 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (stating that an "insurer may reject a
[policy limits] settlement offer and insist on litigation if it has a bona fide belief
that it has a good possibility of succeeding on the merits").72 See Dan'yland Ins. Co. v. Herman, 954 P.2d 56, 61 (N.M. 1997).
1 See Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of R.I. v Rhode Island
Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 703 A.2d 1097, 1102 (R.I. 1997) ("[A]n insurer must
refrain from acts that demonstrate greater concern for the insurer's monetary
interest than the financial risk attendant to the insured's situation.") (citing Allstate
Ins. Co. v Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 656-57 (Md. 1994)).
74 See Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 792 P.2d 719,722-23 (Ariz.
1990); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Bishara, 916 P.2d 1275, 1278-80 (Idaho 1996); see also
1 WINDT, supra note 24, § 5.01, at 295.
s Smith v Audubon Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 372 (La. 1996).
76 Id. at 376.
7But see Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565,571 (Arz. 1986) (stating that an
insurer's duty to give its insured's interests equal consideration is "of a fiduciary
nature").
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required to place the insured's interests above its own.7 An insurer's good
faith duty of equal consideration is much more constrained.79 Indeed, the
recognition of a fiduciary duty to settle cases within policy limits would
render the duty of good faith and fair dealing meaningless. This is because
any breach of an insurer's Implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
settlement context would necessarily be a breach of the insurer's fiduciary
duty 
80
The fact that a liability insurer has no duty to disregard its own
interests when they conflict with the insured's interests clearly evidences
the lack of a fiduciary relationship." The Delaware Supreme Court
explained how this clash of interests is incompatible with a fiduciary
relationship in Corrado Brothers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. 2
The insured in Corrado Brothers argued that the insurer had not settled a
workers' compensation claim in good faith because, in doing so, it caused
the insured to be charged an additional retrospective premium of nearly
$50,000.3 More particularly, the insured argued "that an insurer's duty in
handling a claim, having a potential for the imposition of a retrospective
premium, is to be measured by the standards of a fiduciary "84
Although persuaded that "an insurer may not settle a claim in which a
retrospective premium will be imposed on the insured unless the settlement
is both in good faith and reasonable,"85 the Corrado Brothers court
71 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 503 (Wash. 1992).
79 See Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285, 1289 (Colo. 1996) ("One
who is acting as a fiduciary for another has the duty to act with the utmost good
faith and loyalty on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the other person The duty
required of an insurer towards the insured is much more constrained.") (citations
omitted).
8oSee Barker et al., supra note 9, at 9-10.
81 See Henry v Associated Indem. Corp., 266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 586 (Ct. App.
1990) (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. Rptr. 372
(Ct. App. 1989)).82Corrado Bros., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 562 A.2d 1188 (Del. 1989).
83See id. at 1190-91. A retrospective premium is determined annually based on
the insured's losses the previous year, best known as "claim experience." The
insurer and the insured establish an annual premium at the inception of the policy
period based on estimated losses for the ensuing year. If the actual losses during the
policy period are lower than estimated, the insured receives a partial premium
rebate. If actual losses are greater than estimated, the insurer charges the insured
an additional premium. SeeDouglas R. Richmond, Self-Insurance and theDecision
to Settle, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 987, 989 (1995).
84 Corrado Bros., 562 A.2d at 1192.
51d. at 1191.
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concluded "that the term 'fiduciary' overstates the essential relationship"
between an insurer and its insured. 6
The concept of a fiduciary relationship, which denves from the law of
trusts, is more aptly applied in legal relationships where the interests of
the fiduciary and the beneficiary incline toward a common goal and in
which the fiduciary is required to pursue solely the interests of the
beneficiary The relationship of insurer and insured, however, arises
contractually with each party reserving certain rights under the contract,
the resolution of which often leads to litigation. Thus, the settlement of a
claim may benefit the insurer to the extent that it eliminates or reduces the
cost of contesting the clann through litigation. The settlement may,
however, prejudice the interests of the insured to the extent that settlement
may result in an increase in future premiums or represent a tacit admission
of liability This expected clash of interests is clearly not compatible with
the concept of a fiduciary 
8 7
Were the insurer-insured relationship ever to be fairly characterized as
fiduciary, Corrado Brothers was the platform. The insured's retrospective
premium obligation arguably should have heightened the insurer's duty to
consider and accommodate its insured's interests. Even in that situation,
however, the insurer was not required to ignore its own legitimate interests
in order to benefit the insured.
Courts occasionally assert that an insurer's equal consideration of its
insured's interests in the settlement context will not satisfy the insurer's
duty of good faith. Instead, "the insurer must conduct itself as though it
alone were liable for the entire amount of the judgment."8 8 This would
appear to express a fiduciary duty, inasmuch as the insurer is being
required to make its policyholder's interests paramount. Such courts would
seem to compel an insurer to elevate the insured's interests above its own.
That is, of course, what the law requires of a fiduciary when his interests
and hs beneficiary's interests do not align. An examination of representa-
tive cases reveals, however, that the duty being announced is simply one
of good faith and fair dealing.
In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,89 for example, the
California Supreme Court stated the rule that an insurer"when determining
86Id. at 1192.
87Id. (citations omitted).
88Johansen v. California State Auto. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744,748 (Cal.
1975).89Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979).
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whether to settle a claim, must give at least as much consideration to the
welfare of its insured as it gives its own mterests." Having announced an
insurer's duty to settle a claim within policy limits, the court went on to
express that the "governing standard" for measunng an insurer's good faith
"is whether a prudent insurer would have accepted the settlement offer if
it alone were to be liable for the entire judgment."' In other words, a
prudent insurer must carefully and accurately evaluate a case's verdict
value, just as any reasonable litigant should. The Egan court's ordered
statement of an insurer's Implied duty to settle within policy limits and the
measure of its good faith relative to that duty makes clear that metaphori-
cally placing the insurer in the insured's shoes is not the expression of a
fiduciary standard.
In Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Herman,92 the New Mexico Supreme
Court stated that an insurer "should place itself m the shoes of the
insured9 3 and act as though it alone would bear any judgment.94 Were
another court to read only that passage, it might conclude that an insurer
must act as a fiduciary when evaluating settlement. What the Daryland
court actually held, however, was that while an insurer's good faith
evaluation of the risks and benefits attending settlement offers is generally
accorded judicial deference, the insurer's judgment should receive less
deference where "there is a substantial likelihood of a recovery that
exceeds policy limits." 5 When a third-party claimant makes a firm and
reasonable offer to settle what is clearly an excess claim within policy
limits, the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing may well require it
to settle.16 If the insurer breaches its duty of good faith by refusing to
accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits when there is a
substantial likelihood of an excess verdict, the insurer will be liable for the
entire amount of any subsequent judgment.97
The Dairyland court did not state that an insurer must always accept a
third-party claimant's settlement offer,9" or that it is forbidden to consider
9o Id. at 145.
91Id.92 Daryland Ins. Co. v. Herman, 954 P.2d 56 (N.M. 1997).
93Id. at 61.
4 See id.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 See id.
91 The court expressly noted that "there is no presupposition that settlement is
always the preferred means of protecting the policyholder's interests." Id.
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its own interests when weighing settlement. 9 The court held only that an
insurer cannot gamble with the insured's money An insurer that is wil-
ling to bet against an excess verdict must back its play with its own
money 100
In short, an insurer's obligation to pay an excess verdict when it rejects
a policy limits settlement offer is not linked to a fiduciary duty An insurer
that gives its insured's interests equal consideration before rejecting a
policy limits offer in what is clearly an excess liability case realistically
bears the same liability if that decision was made without any regard for the
insured's interests.' 0' An insurer may mcur liability in excess of its policy
limits without acting in bad faith."2 Prioritizing the insured's interests will
seldom change the ultimate outcome. Given that a failure to settle will
typically leave the insurer liable for the full amount of any subsequent
excess verdict, it is in all likelihood an insurer's consideration of its own
interests that causes it to settle within policy limits when faced with
probable excess liability To behave otherwise is to render meaningless the
policy limits for which it bargained. An insurer's decision to accept a
9 See id. (stating that a liability insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing
"means that 'an insurer cannot be partial to its own interests, but must give its
interests and the interests of its insured equal consideration' ") (quoting Lujan v
Gonzales, 501 P.2d 673, 680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972)).
""'See id. (stating that"[t]he courts oftus state will not permit insurers to profit
by their own wrongs").
'01 This is generally so because an insurer that declines or fails to settle a case
within policy limits may breach its contract with its insured without committing an
act of bad faith. The insured would thus be entitled to recover all consequential
damages flowing from the insurer's breach, including any excessjudgment. As one
noted insurance law scholar explains:
Contract remedies applied flexibly could go far toward fully compensating
the aggrieved insured. If an insurer unjustifiably refuses to accept a
reasonable settlement offer, it is a foreseeable consequence of the insurer's
conduct that ajudgment might be entered in excess of the policy limits. If
the duty to settle is treated as a subsidiary element of the contractually
based duty to defend, the excess judgment would still be the insurer's
responsibility under contract law's remedial scheme.
ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G, at 155 (2d ed.
1996).
1"2 See First State Ins. Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 971 P.2d 953,959 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1999) (distinguishing between an insurer's negligence and bad faith in
failing to settle within policy limits, and stating that an insurer may be compelled
to pay an excess judgment where it fails to "use ordinary care yet [does] not act in
bad faith").
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policy limits settlement offer is more an act of economic self-interest than
an attempt to protect the insured.
2. First-Party Insurance
An insured may depend on his first-party insurer to provide a cushion
in times of hardship, or security and peace of mind in the face of calamity
There are many examples of such dependence: a life insurance policy may
support a family for years after the policyholder dies, health insurance may
spare a seriously ill person runous medical expenses, uninsured motorist
insurance may make an accident victim whole when a tortfeasor cannot,
and business interruption coverage may save an enterprise from bank-
ruptcy Be that as it may, and just as with liability insurance, a first-party
insurer has no obligation to pay claims that its policy does not cover, or to
take any other action inconsistent with the terms of its policy
When presented with a claim by its insured, a first-party insurer need
not pay automatically 103 An insurer is free to verify the existence of a
claimed loss, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the loss to
determine the existence and scope of coverage, and to determine the
amount payable for a covered loss. An insurance company may challenge
or dispute a claim that is "fairly debatable" without breaching its duty of
good faith to the insured."'
The law vests insurers with the right and obligation to scrutinize the
legitimacy or validity of claims presented, and to limit their payment to
those clamis that pass muster. Insurers may even have a duty to their other
policyholders to contest illegitimate claims."' The recognition of a duty to
dispute questionable clais rests on the assumption that an insurer's
payment of illegitimate claims raises the cost of insurance for all of the
103 See Lucas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 963 P.2d 357, 360 (Idaho 1998)
("Good faith and fair dealing with an insured does not include the payment of sums
that are reasonably in dispute, but only the payment of legitimate damages.").
1' See, e.g., Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 977 P.2d 134, 137-40
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Idaho
1997); Sampson v. American Standard Ins. Co., 582N.W.2d 146,150 (Iowa 1998);
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996 S.W.2d 437, 453-54 (Ky. 1999); Radecki v.
Mutual ofOmaha Ins. Co., 583 N.W.2d 320,326 (Neb. 1998); Asermely v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461,464 (R.I. 1999); Stene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
583 N.W.2d 399, 403 (S.D. 1998); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d
461, 464-65 (Utah 1996); Lauzon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 A.2d
1246, 1247 (Vt. 1995).
'o5 See Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So. 2d 389, 393 (Fla. 1998).
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company's policyholders."° An insurer's ability to contest illegitimate
claims is important, for insurance fraud is.a significant problem."7 Of
course, an insurance company's careful analysis of claims submitted to it
is contrary to the interests of any given insured making a claim, for the
insured is interested in the most generous possible payment made hastily
and with no questions being asked.
The relationship between a first-party insurer and its policyholder is ill-
suited for fiduciary controls. Indeed, fiduciary theory simply does not work
here for at least two reasons. First and foremost, an insurer's interests and
an insured's interests are not aligned when the insured is claiming on his
own behalf, as they are in third-party cases where insurer and insured face
a common adversary. 08 The insurer is never cast as the insured's agent."°
The insurer and insured do not deal in trust when a first-party claim is
made; here they are adversaries." 0 Even when a claim is clearly covered,
the insurer and insured may disagree over the amount due or the nature of
the benefits to be paid. This inherent conflict, which is well-recognized in
insurance law, cannot be reconciled with the existence of a fiduciary
relationship.
Second, there is no conceivable set of circumstances in which the
insured surrenders control of litigation in which it is a party to the insurer.
In the first-party context, any litigation is the product of either the insured
or the insurer suing the other. Regardless, the insured controls the
litigation."'
0 See id. (stating that an insurer's "[p]ayment of illegitimate claims raises the
costs of insurance for all policyholders"); see also Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles,
950 S.W.2d 48, 60 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., concurring) ("Indeed, from a
competitive viewpoint, an insurer must pay only valid claims and must deny
invalid claims to keep premiums to customers to a minimum.").
107 See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 61 (Hecht, J., concurring) (discussing several
studies on the frequency or prevalence of insurance fraud).
10 See id. at 60.
"o See Beck v Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985)
(distinguishing between third-party and first-party insurance and holding that m a
first-party relationship the insurer's duties are contractual rather than fiduciary).
"' See State ex rel. Safeco Nat'l Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Rauch, 849 S.W.2d 632,634
(Mo. Ct App. 1993); Lauzon v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 1246,
1248 (Vt. 1995).
. See, e.g., McCauley v. Suls, 716 A.2d 1129, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)
(stating that "an insurance company owes no fiduciary duty in a first-party claim
because the insured controls the litigation and a fiduciary duty need not be
imposed").
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The inapplicability of a fiduciary duty to the first-party insurance
relationship was explamedmKanne v. Connecticut GeneralLife Insurance
Co. 12 The Kanne plaintiffs sued their health insurer for breach of contract,
bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and the breach of certain
statutory duties in connection with the delayed payment ofvanous medical
bills." 11 The Kanne court found for the plaintiffs on their breach of contract
and bad faith claims and awarded them exemplary damages, but rejected
their breach of fiduciary duty claim."14 It reasoned that while an insurer's
duty of good faith and fair dealing may be "fiduciary in nature, it does not
create a fiduciary relationship."' 11 The Kanne court further stated:
In the insurance context, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing requires no more than "that each party is prevented from
interfering with the other's right to benefit from the contract." It does not
further require that the insurer place the insured's interests above its own
as would be the case were the insured a fiduciary."
6
Beyond the principle that an insurer need only give its insured's
interests equal consideration, the Kanne court observed an insurer "is
privileged, in pursuing its own economic interests, to assert its legal
rights.""' 7 An insurer is not required to pay every claim presented. The
company has a duty to its other policyholders and to the public "not to
dissipate its reserves through payment of meritless claims." ' I
Recogmzmg the inherent conflict of interest between a first-party
insurer and its insured, the Kanne court applied strict rules of construction
against the insurer to remedy the unfairness and lack of reason evident in
its conduct." 9 The court also enforced the insurer's duty of good faith and
fair dealing." The court declined to go farther, however, observing that
"2 Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 607 F Supp. 899 (C.D. Cal. 1985),
judgment vacated inpart by 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
906 (1989).
13 See id. at 902-04.
14 See id. at 908-10.
15 Id. at 908.
" 6 Id. (citation omitted).
"
7 Id. (citing Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App.
1970)).
". Id. (quoting Austero v. National Cas. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 653,672 (Ct. App.
1978), rejected by McCormck v Sentinel Life Ins. Co. 200 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Ct.
App. 1984)).
19 See id.
'2 1 See zd. at 907-08.
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"while Connecticut General [was] obliged to act m good faith and deal
fairly, this is not a fiduciary duty "
D. Insurers' Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and the Insurer-
Insured Relationship
An insurer who breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing may be
sued in tort for bad faith.'22 In the case of a liability insurer charged with
bad faith for not settling a claim within policy limits, the determination of
whether the insurer acted in bad faith will require a weighing of such
factors as: (1) the probability of the insured's liability; (2) the amount of
the policy limits; (3) the extent of the claimant's damages; (4) the adequacy
of the insurer's investigation; (5) whether the insurer followed its own
defense attorney's advice regarding settlement; (6) whether any misrepre-
sentations were made by the insured which may have misled the insurer in
settlement negotiations; and (7) the openness of the communications
between the insurer and the insured." And, of course, there must be a
judgment in excess of policy limits. 24 In the first-party context, an
aggrieved insured generally must establish (1) that the insurer's conduct
was unreasonable and (2) that the insurer knew or should have known it
was being unreasonable in order to prevail on a bad faith claim."z The
1211d. at 908.
"2 "Bad faith" cannot be uniformly defined or described. The majority rule
appears to be that there must be some level of intentional wrongdoing by an insurer
in order to support a bad faith claim. The insurer must do more than simply breach
its contract with the insured. As the Arkansas Supreme Court observed m State
Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Swaim, 991 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1999):
"An insurance company commits the tort of bad faith when it affirmatively engages
in dishonest, malicious or oppressive conduct in order to avoid ajust obligation to
its insured." Id. at 559. "Mere negligence or bad judgment is insufficient so long
as the insurer is acting in good faith." Id. This sort of high standard is not universal,
however. Some states allow bad faith recovery for an insurer's negligence. See
Richmond, supra note 21, at 98.
'23 These factors are drawn from Truck Insurance Exchange v. Bishara, 916
P.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Idaho 1996), and Smith v. Audubon Insurance Co., 679 So.
2d 372, 377 (La. 1996). See also Smith v. General Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d
168, 170-71 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that an insurer's failure to keep the insured
informed of settlement negotiations can be evidence of bad faith).
124 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla.
1997); Jarvis v Farmers Ins. Exch., 948 P.2d 898, 901-02 (Wyo. 1997).
'5See, e.g., Turnerv State Farm Fire & Cas. Cos., 614 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Ala.
1993); Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 977 P.2d 807, 815 (Ariz. Ct.
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unreasonableness of the insurer's conduct is the essence of the first-party
tort.
1 26
Courts have fashioned a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing
specifically for the insurer-insured relationship.127 An insurer's duty of
good faith and fair dealing protects a policyholder against an insurer's
exploitation of its superior bargaining power and exclusive control over
claim processing.12 It compels an insurer to commumcate with its insured
and to repeatedly weigh the insured's best interests in light of shifting
circumstances. If an insurer breaches its duty, the insured may recover a
range of compensatory damages intended to restore the insured to the
position he would have enjoyed but for the insurer's bad faith. An insurer
that unreasonably refuses to settle a third-party claim within its policy
limits becomes liable for any judgment exceeding its policy limits.2 9
Insureds may also recover damages for emotional distress or mental
anguish, interest, lost income, and other related economic losses. In
addition, most jurisdictions allow punitive damages m bad faith actions. 30
Assumingthat insureds need atort remedy for reckless or unscrupulous
behavior by insurers, the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all
insurance policies affords all the relief and shelter necessary The
compensatory and punitive damages available to msureds in bad faith
actions deter reckless or unscrupulous conduct by insurers. If an insurer is
undeterred, a bad faith action is a powerful weapon for righting the wrong.
App. 1998); Dale v Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 948 P.2d 545, 551 (Colo. 1997);
Sampson v. American Standard Ins. Co., 582 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Iowa 1998);
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Simpsonville Wrecker Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d
886, 888 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); Lauzon v State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 674 A.2d
1246, 1247 (Vt. 1995); Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 541 N.W.2d 753, 757
(Wis. 1995); Ahrenholtz v. Time Ins. Co., 968 P.2d 946, 950-51 (Wyo. 1998).
An insurance company cannot be liable for bad faith if it had a reasonable basis
for denying a claim. See Murphree v. Federal Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 523, 529 (Miss.
1997); Martin v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 573 N.W.2d 823, 829 (N.D.
1998); see, e.g., ExParte GovernmentEmployees Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d299, 305-06
(Ala. 1999).
"2 See Alsobrook v. National Travelers Life Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 768,770 (Okla.
CL App. 1992); see, e.g., Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189,
197-98 (Tex. 1998) (finding for health insurer because there was no evidence that
it acted unreasonably).
'
27 See Richmond, supra note 21, at 76-80 (discussing the lstory of bad faith
in insurance law).
'sSee Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex. 1997).
'
29 See Richmond, supra note 21, at 79.
130 See id. at 79-80.
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The tort of bad faith provides for all of those damages that an insured might
recover for an insurer's breach of fiduciary duty, and perhaps more. The
threat of a bad faith clam forces insurers to protect msureds' best interests
m ways that allow msureds to enjoy the peace of mind and security for
which they bargained.
Although heightening insurers' duties to those of fiduciaries would
afford msureds greater protection still,'3 ' extending such protection would
be inconsistent with the public and private interests that permeate
insurance. If insurers were made to be true fiduciaries, they would lose
their ability to hold down premiums by weeding out illegitimate claims,
contesting an insured's liability, or disputing a third-party claimant's
damages. The cure might then be worse than the illness because insurers
would then surely have to fund their new duty through significantly
increased premiums.
Try though some courts might, it is not possible to make insurers
fiduciaries to their insureds for some claim-related purposes, but not for
others. For example, a first-party insurer cannot be a fiduciary to its insured
when it comes to communicating claim information or facts learned during
an investigation, but share some lesser relationship when it comes time to
deny the claim as invalid, or pay less than the full amount requested by the
insured. At all times the insurer and the insured are bound by the terms of
their contract, and the resolution of any claim involves more than the
simple act of payment. Accordingly, consistent judicial enforcement of
insurers' duty of good faith and fair dealing in all aspects of their relation-
ships with their insureds is the most reasonable approach to preventing and
remedying unreasonable or oppressive conduct by insurers.
But if the insurer-insured relationship is not fiduciary, how should it be
characterized? Courts often characterize it as "special."'3 That is not a bad
description, for the insurer-insured relationship seems protective by nature
and tort law treats some protective relationships as "special" for duty
purposes.' At the same time, characterizing the insurer-insured relation-
ship as a "special relationship" paints with too broad a brush. The insurer-
3 See Robacki v. Allstate Ins. Co., 468 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
("An implied duty of good faith and fair dealing has never been held to constitute
a fiduciary duty.").
'
32 See, e.g., Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 272 (Nev. 1996);
Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. 1994); Long v.
Great W Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 829 (Wyo. 1998).
133 See generally W. PAGE KEEToN ETAL., PROSSERAND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 56, at 383-85 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing duty and protective
relationships).
[VOL. 88
INSURERS ARE NOT FIDUCIARIES
insured relationship is made "special" by the same factors that require a
cause of action for bad faith, all of which are linked to the underlying
insurance policy "I4 An insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing is
implied m support ofthe policy;135 it would not exist otherwise. The precise
nature of an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing-and thus the
contours of its relationship with its insured-depend on the nature and
purpose of the underlying policy No policy, no relationship, no duty
Accordingly, the msurer-msuredrelationship is best described as a special
kind of contractual relationship.1
36
Certainly, the insurer-insured relationship is contractual.137 But it
differs from other contractual relationships. It merits recognition as a
special kind of contractual relationship because the insurance policy out of
which the relationship arises and around which it centers "represents a
unique type of legally enforceable contract.' ' 38 An insurance policy is
different from other contracts because in both first-party and third-party
arrangements it gives "the insurer almost adjudicatory responsibility "'139
The insurer determines coverage, the validity of claims, the value of
claims, whether and how much to pay, and the like. Although the insured
has the power to enforce the contract, invoking his rights or remedies
detracts significantly from the peace of mind and security that he thought
he purchased with the policy 14 The contractual relationship between an
insurer and its insured is built on more than the carrier's bare promise to
pay covered claims. 4
The idea that the insurer-insured relationship is a special land of
contractual relationship finds support in the courts' treatment of insurers'
1
34SeegenerallyLovewellv. Physicians Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ohio
1997) ("It is axiomatic that the language of the insurance contract determines
[the insured's and insurer's] respective nghts and obligations subject to the
limitations of the law.").
135 See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 639 (Cal. 1995) (stating that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing "is implied as a supplement to the [policy's]
express contractual covenants").
136 Cf. Decker v. Browning-Ferns Indus., 931 P.2d 436, 443 (Colo. 1997)
(describing an insurance policy as a "special contract").
137 See Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285, 1289 (Colo. 1996);
Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d 893, 897 (W Va. 1998).
138 DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 547 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Wis. 1996)
(quoting Elliott v. Donahue, 485 N.W.2d 403,407 (Wis. 1992)).
139 Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986).
140 See id.
141 See id.
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duty of good faith and fair dealing. The implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing clearly is a contract law principle." But while that duty is found
in all contracts, it became a tort duty in insurance and is enforced almost
exclusively in connection with insurance policies. For example, courts
routinely reject the argument that an employment agreement includes an
implied duty of good faith and far dealing sounding in tort. This is even
though an employment contract is of great economic significance to an
employee because it provides the means for an employee to meet his basic
needs.
143
And why does it matter how the insurer-insured relationship is
classified or described? Is it inportant for any reason other than the law's
love of precision? Correctly describing the insurer-insured relationship is
important because the nature of the relationship determines the parties'
duties and rights. Altering the relationship between insurer and insured
upsets their bargain. Even minor misstatements, such as describing the
insurer-insured relationship as "alan" or "analogous" to a fiduciary
relationship, can lead to uncertain results. Treating the insurer-insured
relationship as a special kind of contractual relationship provides a
predictable basis for deciding disputes.
III. THE FLAWED RISE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN
INSURANCE LAW
The principle that an insurer is a fiduciary to its insured is arguably
attributable to language found in the dissenting opmion in Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.1" In Gruenberg, the California Supreme Court held
that first-party insurers owe their insureds a duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and that the breach of that duty is actionable in tort. 4 Indeed,
Gruenberg is widely recognized as the landmark first-party bad faith
case. 146
In his dissent, Justice Roth wrote that in the third-party context an
insurer's right to control litigation against an insured and the insured's duty
to cooperate in his defense "creates a fiduciary agency between the [insurer
142 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
143 See, e.g., Deckerv. Browning-Ferns Indus., 931 P.2d436,444 (Colo. 1997);
Francis v Lee Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 710-11 (Haw. 1999).
'44 Gruenberg v Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
145 See Id. at 1038.
146 See, e.g., Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of
Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the
Commercial Realm, 86 COLO. L. REV 377, 381-84 (1986).
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and the insured]." 47 He further observed that a liability insurer that fails to
give its insured's interests paramount consideration when presented with
a policy limits settlement offer in a potential excess liability case acts in
bad faith and "renders the insurer liable for breach of its fiduciary duty "14
Continuing, but equivocating, he observed that a liability insurer's implied
duty to settle "equates with a fiduciary duty on the insurer."'49
Justice Roth's point was that liability insurers and first-party insurers
do not share the same relationships with their insureds. In the liability
insurance context, most covered claims are settled short of trial, and that
is one of the usual means by which the insured is protected. A first-party
insurance policy does not create a situation whereby an insurer effectively
can gamble with the insured's money 150 For that reason, he did not believe
that the court should recognize bad faith as a tort in the first-party
insurance context.'5 '
Justice Roth's comments about a liability insurer's supposed fiduciary
duties ought not be seen as having precedential value-or even persuasive
value-for several reasons. First, Justice Roth misinterpreted the California
precedent he cited to support his statement that a liability insurer's duty to
settle certain claims within policy limits "equates with a fiduciary duty "152
The cases on which he chiefly relied-Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co. 11 and Crsci v. Security Insurance Co.' -do not stand for
that principle. In both Comunale and Crisci the California Supreme Court
held only that an insurer must give its insured's interests at least as much
consideration as it gives its own.' That is not the expression of a fiduciary
duty
Second, to the extent Justice Roth wanted to make the point that a
liability insurer has a duty to settle clear excess claims within policy limits,
he never needed to brand the insurer-insured relationship "fiduciary" An
insurer's duty of good faith compels it to settle in a case of clear excess
... Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1043 (Roth, J., dissenting).
148 rd.
149.[d.
1
50 See id.
' See id. at 1049.
1.12 1d. at 1043.
' Comunale v Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
4 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
'
55 See Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201 ("The insurer, m deciding whether a claim
should be compromised, must take into account the interest of the insured and give
it at least as much consideration as it does to its own interest."); Crsci, 426 P.2d
at 176-78 (citing Comunale.)
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liability. In fact, Justice Roth twice appeared to confuse fiduciary duty with
the lesser duty of good faith and fair dealing." 6 Third, California courts
have long rejected Justice Roth's position that a liability insurer has a duty
"to handle all claims with the interest of the insured uppermost," 5 7 which
expresses a fiduciary standard. Ignoring Comunale and Crisci, for at least
twenty years California courts have held only that insurers must protect
their insureds' interests equally with their own. 15
Judicial or scholarly reliance on Gruenberg for the recognition of a
fiduciary relationslnp between insurers and insureds is at best careless.
Sloppy language amounting to dicta in a dissenting opinion resting on an
obligation that has been squarely rejected by courts of that same state is an
infirm doctrinal foundation.
Another California case sometimes cited for the proposition that an
insurer is a fiduciary to its insured is Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co.' s9 As noted earlier, Egan clearly stated the general rule that an insurer's
duty of good faith is one of equal consideration. 16 Later in the opinion, the
court explained why an insured could recover punitive damages for an
insurer's bad faith despite a California statute limiting the award of
punitive damages to those actions "for the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract."' 6' In doing so it quoted a law review article:
"Suppliers of services affected with a public interest must take the
public's interest seriously, where necessary placing it before their interest
in maximizing gains and limiting disbursements [A]s a supplier of a
public service rather than a manufactured product, the obligations of
insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage. The
obligations ofgoodfaith andfair dealing encompass qualities ofdecency
and humanity inherent in the responsibilities ofa fiductary. Insurers hold
151 See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1043 (stating that an insurer's failure to settle
within policy limits "is bad faith and renders the insured liable for breach of its
fiduciary duty"); see id. (stating that an insurer's good faith duty to settle "equates
with a fiduciary duty").
157 Id.
' See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141,145 (Cal. 1979);
Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 331 (Ct App. 1980).
159 Egan, 620 P.2d at 141.
'6 See id. at 145. See supra text accompanying notes 89-9 1.
161 Egan, 620 P.2d at 146 (emphasis added) (quoting CAL. Civ CODE § 3294
(West 1997)).
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themselves out asfiducianes, and with the public's trust must goprvate
responsibility consonant with that trust."'162
The Egan court's point was not that insurers are fiduciaries, but rather
that the insurer-insured relationship is not adversarial and is similar to a
fiduciary relationship insofar as an insurer sometimes must consider its
insured's interests rather than attending solely to its own interests. This
view of Egan is confirmed by the court's description of the insurer-insured
relationship as a "special relationship.' 6 3 Had the Egan court meant to
brand the insurer-insured relationship fiduciary it surely would have done
SO.
No one should now rely on any California case as authority for the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between insurers and their insureds.
California courts have made clear that the insurer-insured relationship is
not fiduciary 164
Beyond California's borders, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
White v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co. 161 is commonly viewed as
supporting the existence of a fiduciary relationship between insurers and
insureds. This view is simply maccurate.
The White court held "that there exists a common law tort action,
distinct from an action on the contract, for an insurer's bad faith in settling
the first party claims of its insured."' In deciding to apply tort principles
to first-party insurance, the White court had to distinguish insurance
policies from other contracts in order to expand the damages available to
an aggrieved insured. 167 Continuing, the court reasoned that there exists a
"special relationship" between insurers and insureds that justifies the
recognition of a tort cause of action for bad faith in the first-party
context.
168
In explaining its reasoning, the White court quoted the California
Supreme Court's decision in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard
'
62 Id. (quoting William M. Goodman & Thorn Greenfield Seaton, Foreword:
Ripe for Decision, Internal Worlangs and Current Concerns of the California
Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REv 309, 346-47 (1974)) (emphasis added).
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Henry v. Associated Indem. Corp., 266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 586 (Ct.
App. 1990); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. Rptr. 372 (Ct.
App. 1989).
161 White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986).
166 Id. at 1020.
16 7 See id. at 10 17-19.
'
61 See id. at 1019-20.
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Oil,169 in which that court stated the insurer-insured relationship is
characterized by elements of "public interest, adhesion and fiduciary
responsibility " 70 But the White court expressly rejected the principle that
an insurer is a fiduciary to its insured, limiting its fiduciary analogy to a
recognition that an insured sometimes has the right to trust his insurer to
look out for his best interests,' 7 1 thus justifying the recognition of a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing premised on the "special relation-
ship" between insurer and insured.172
The term "fiduciary" next appears in a passage dealing with the
defending insurance company's attempt to distinguish liability insurance
from first-party insurance, and thus halt the spread of the bad faith tort into
the first-party realm. The court observed that the defendant "concedes that
while an action sounding in tort may be applicable in third party situations
due to the fiduciary relationship established when the insurer assumes
control of the litigation it has no merit when the insured is bringing the
action himself."'" In rejecting the defendant's argument against first-party
bad faith, the court observed that the simple filing of a lawsuit by a first-
party insured "does not necessarily create an adversarial relationship
between himself and the insurer which abrogates the special relationship
Imposed by the insurance contract."1 74
The White court did not recognize the existence of a fiduciary duty in
this portion of its opinion, either. Rather, the court sought to explain that
the differing first-party relationship-where an insurer and insured
generally are seen as having opposing interests as soon as the insured seeks
benefits under the policy-is of a nature that a bad faith tort is required to
protect insureds from overreaching by insurers.175 While there maybe a tort
action for the willful breach of an insurance contract and an insurer's bad
faith in failing to promptly settle a valid claim, the outcome of any such
action will depend on the facts of the particular case.176 An insurer is not
169 Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil, 686 P.2d 1158 (1984),
overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
171 Id. at 1166; see also White, 730 P.2d at 1019.
171 See White, 730 P.2d at 1019 (quoting Charles M. Loudenback& Thomas W
Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort ofBad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F
L. REv 187,200-01 (1982)).
' 72 See id.
I73 d. at 10 19-20 (emphasis added).
I74 d. at 1020 (citing Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 848, 850 (Idaho
1986)).
'
75 See id.
176 See id.
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guilty of bad faith if"it challenges the validity of a fairly debatable claim,
or when its delay [of payment] results from an honest mistake." '
In conclusion, the cases from the 1970s and 1980s that are most often
cited as supporting the existence of a fiduciary relationship between an
insurer and its msureds are not persuasive. They can be said to support the
existence of fiduciary duties only if the proponent misunderstands their
explanatory language. Other courts have senselessly confused and blended
bad faith with breach of fiduciary duty.178 Fiduciary duty has crept into the
msurer-msured relationship as a result of careless explanation, misunder-
standing, and artless language.
CONCLUSION
The duty of a fiduciary is to act with utmost loyalty to his beneficiary
A fiduciary must give unyielding priority to his beneficiary's best interests
whenever he acts on his beneficiary's behalf. In contrast, neither party to
a contract has an obligation to take care ofthe other. Contracting parties are
free to pursue their own interests without regard for the interests of the
other. A contractual relationship is essentially adversarial, within certain
bounds of commercial honesty
Insurance policies are a special kind of contract because of their almost
adjudicatory nature and the insured's special reliance on the insurer. An
insurance policy embodies more than a carrier's bare promise to pay
covered claims. Accordingly, the relationship between an insurer and an
insured is a special kind of contractual relationship. Courts protect
insureds' interests in this relationship by enforcing insurers' implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
No matter how else it might be described, the msurer-msured relation-
ship is not a fiduciary one. Altering the special contractual relationship
between insurer and insured by branding it fiduciary upsets the parties'
bargain. To impose fiduciary duties on insurers would prevent them from
acting to protect their own interests and those of other policyholders. To
routinely make insurers fiduciaries would also prevent them from
contesting excessive or fraudulent claims, thus harming the insurance-
buying public. Even minor indiscretions, such as describing the insurer-
insured relationship as "alan" or "analogous" to a fiduciary relationship,
can lead to uncertain results. Judicial enforcement of insurers' inplied duty
'"Id. (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 572-73 (Ariz. 1986)).
s See, e.g., Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725,730-31, 741 (Mont.
1984).
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of good faith and fair dealing affords insureds all the protection they need
against overreaching and abuse by insurers, while avoiding the many
problems posed by making the insurer-insured relationship a fiduciary one.
